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 FLANDERS DISTRICT OF CREATIVITY
Flanders District of Creativity is the Flemish organization for entrepreneurial creativity. It was 
founded in 2004 by the Flemish Government as a non-profit organization and enjoys broad support. 
Flemish businesses, academia, and public institutions use Flanders DC as a platform for cooperation 
in the pursuit of a more creative Flanders region. 
Creativity is the key ingredient in making companies more successful and in helping regional 
governments ensure a healthy economy with more jobs. Flanders DC inspires creativity and 
innovation:
1. by learning from the most creative regions in the world,
2. by igniting creative sparks in everyday life and business, and
3. by providing research, practical business tools and business training, in cooperation with 
the Flanders DC Knowledge Centre.
1.  Districts of Creativity: Inspiration from the most creative regions
Responses to global challenges are best found within an international network of excellence. With 
the single aim of learning from the very best, Flanders DC aims to unite the most dynamic regions 
in the world within the ‘Districts of Creativity’ network. Every two years, Flanders DC convenes 
the Creativity World Forum, bringing together government leaders, entrepreneurs, and knowledge 
institutions to exchange ideas about how to tackle pressing economic problems and make their 
regions hotbeds for innovation and creativity. 
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2. Raising awareness: The best way to predict the future is to invent it
Flanders DC encourages entrepreneurs and citizens to 
look ahead and find creative solutions today for tomorrow’s 
problems. Flanders DC has developed an idea-generation 
tool to encourage people and organizations to take the first 
step toward innovation. In addition, Flanders DC has run 
an awareness campaign entitled ‘Flanders‘ Future’ and has 
collaborated with national TV station één (VRT) on an idea 
show named The Devisers (De bedenkers).
3. The Flanders DC Knowledge Centre: Academic support
The Flanders DC Knowledge Centre serves as a link between Flanders 
DC and Vlerick Leuven Gent Management School. Each year, the Flanders 
DC Knowledge Centre publishes several reports and develops various tools, 
case studies and courses. All these projects focus on the role of creativity 
in a business environment and identify obstacles to, and accelerators of 
competitive growth. 
The Creativity Talks − brief monthly, interactive info sessions − update you on these research 
activities. See www.creativitytalks.be for a current calendar and subscription information.
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1  INTRODuCTION
The goal of this paper is analyse the internationalisation strategies of major multinational enterprises 
(MNEs) based in Flanders and Brussels. The analysis focuses in particular on three case studies, 
selected among a subset of Flemish and Brussels’ companies and analyses their expansion path in 
the period from 1995 to 2007.
In order to assess the path followed by the selected companies, a deep analysis of their strategies 
was carried out, also using a longitudinal database of the subsidiaries in the above-mentioned 
period.
It is worth noting that this is the first time that a comprehensive, longitudinal database on the 
international activities of Belgian multinational enterprises was constructed. Previous studies for 
example of the Belgian Federal Planning Bureau had only established cross-sectional databases 
of foreign affiliates at different points in time, with the oldest dating from 1995. These studies give 
us valuable insights in the geographical and sectoral spread of international activities of Belgian 
enterprises. Yet, they do not make it possible to analyze the expansion path of Belgian enterprises 
over longer periods of time.
The methodology used to select the companies to analyse is based on the construction of the 
“Expansion Paths Database” that contains information on companies of Flanders and Brussels that 
appeared at least at one point in time in the BEL20 index of Euronext Brussels. The development of 
a unique, longitudinal database of the foreign activities of these three Flemish and Brussels based 
MNE helps us to improve our insights in their internationalisation process. 
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2  THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
2.1 Internationalisation: a strategic framework
Globalisation is the one of the most important and pervasive forces reshaping the competitive 
environment of business. It has shifted the basis of competition of companies, making it necessary 
to extend the framework of analysis of competitive advantage of firms. It brings more competition to 
the home country of companies, but it also makes it possible for a company to expand the scope of 
its activities in new countries, through their internationalisation strategies.
Internationalisation is “the process of increasing involvement in international markets” (Welch and 
Luostarinen, 1988). In fact, internationalisation cannot be considered as a separate feature of a 
company’s strategy, but should always be seen as a part of its overall competitive strategy.
Competitive strategy is the set of actions put in place by managers of a company to reach the 
objectives based on a company’s mission and vision in positioning itself successfully among 
competitors. This objective can be obtained in two ways, either through cost-cutting strategies or 
through value-adding strategies.
The strategic positioning of a firm will be the result of the decisions taken in terms of creating superior 
value or reducing costs in serving the customer. Internationalisation is part of it and can be used to 
reach those objectives, together with all the other actions that identify the competitive model of the 
firm.
There are two main mechanisms through which internationalisation takes place. The first one is 
through the expansion of a company’s trade scope, and the second one is through the establishment 
of foreign subsidiaries. Studies so far have concentrated, for what concerns Belgium, on the trade 
expansion of firms. This study will focus on activities’ location outside the country, looking therefore 
at the most strategic internationalisation choices, those that involve higher commitment of resources 
by the company.
When a company decides to expand its activities abroad, the success of the operation will be 
based on firm’s specific advantages (FSAs) that constitute a company’s core competencies in terms 
of marketing, R&D, human resources and so forth. These skills are the source of a company’s 
competitive advantage and will therefore impact on a company’s success or failure. This is why 
internationalisation cannot be seen as separated from the company’s competitive strategy, but only 
as a part of it.
There are different models that have been developed to explain the different paths that a company 
can choose to follow when going international. This choice will be influenced by multiple factors. One 
of them is the type of industry a company is active in. For example there is an important difference 
between manufacturing and services industries. In fact the latter has only one way to expand abroad: 
acquiring companies or creating subsidiaries in the new market. This is partly due to the nature of 
their business and the high barriers to cross-border trade in services which are still in place. 
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Figure 2.1 gives an overview of the forces shaping the competitive strategy of a firm, therefore 
impacting on its internationalisation choices.
Figure 2.1 International expansion strategy
There are three main groups of factors influencing a company’s competitive strategy, and therefore 
its subsequent decision to go abroad and compete in international markets. First of all, a company 
has a mission and vision that drive all its actions: all the operations of the company have as a scope 
fulfilling these two. Second, there are the resources and capabilities of the firm that make it unique 
and different from its competitors. The organisational culture and structure – for example – play a 
strong role in defining which path a company will follow. Moreover, resources and competencies not 
only define in which industries the firm will be active, but also which markets it will serve.
Thirdly, industry characteristics play a key role in influencing the competitive strategy of the firm, and 
therefore its internationalisation strategy. This group can be subdivided into four categories: market, 
cost, environment and competitive factors. 
The competitive strategy is the deliberate action plan that results from the interaction of these three 
components and it will in turn influence the internationalisation strategy of the company. Next to 
their impact on the chosen competitive strategy, the resources and capabilities of the firm, as well 
as the different industry drivers may have an additional direct impact on the international expansion 
strategy of the firm. This impact is most prominently present in the contingency approach where 
the international strategy of the firm is seen as part of a process responding to changes in internal 
and external factors acting on the firm (cg infra). Finally, a growing body of the literature underlines 
the important role played by the organisation and its capabilities to implement an international 
expansion strategy, including the experience and learning process underlying the development of 
these capabilities. 
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2.2 Behavioural models of internationalisation
The analytical model outlined above says very little about the actual implementation process behind 
the deployment of international expansion strategies.
There are different ways in which a company can implement internationalisation strategies through 
locating activities abroad. In this section we will introduce the main behavioural theories that have 
been developed to explain the expansion paths followed by companies. 
From the beginning of the 70s, many authors have tried to explain the internationalisation process 
of firms. The most influent theory is the one developed in 1977 by Johanson and Vahlne (1977), the 
so-called u-model which focuses on how organisations learn over time and how this affects their 
investment behaviour.
 
According to this model internationalisation occurs as a series of incremental steps through which 
the company gradually increases its experiential knowledge of foreign markets, therefore reducing 
the risk level. Consequently a company will start its expansion from close to successively more 
distant countries. Distance is not only measured in physic terms, but also as a mix of factors like 
language, culture and legal and business practices. The more a company expands to a larger 
number of countries the more the commitment increases, as market knowledge increases. Therefore 
a causal repeating decision cycle develops, in which current activities are the source of incremental 
knowledge and – consequently – company’s commitment in terms of resources.
Based on these two aspects, the authors identify four stages in the expansion process as shown in 
figure 2.2.
Figure 2.2 The incremental steps of internationalisation
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In this study we focus on the international location of activities and therefore on the third and fourth 
step of this ladder, the point in which market knowledge and resources commitment are high and 
the decision to expand is grounded in the competitive strategy of the firm.
Although criticized, this theory has been very influential and still today many authors put strong 
accent on the influence of distance and proximity on internationalisation decisions of companies. 
The main criticisms came from the fact that the model was too deterministic and strong boundaries 
were put between the different stages, although practice did not support this theoretical framework. 
Moreover, the assumption that the authors make is that companies first establish a strong position 
in the home market and then eventually decide to expand the scope of their activities abroad. This 
was not the case for a large number of companies that delineated the scope of their activities as 
international from the very beginning. 
After being criticised during the 80s, the authors allowed for three exceptions to their model. The 
first one was related to firms that have a vast pool of resources. These firms can take larger or 
faster internationalisation steps compared to smaller firms. The second exception involves those 
markets in which there are stable or homogeneous conditions. In this cases knowledge gains can 
be achieved through mechanisms that are different from experience. The last exception was made 
for firms with experience from similar market conditions that can possibly generalise these to a new 
specific market.
These exceptions were introduced also to integrate this theory with concepts developed by the 
network theory.
In this second model of the internationalisation process introduced by Johanson and Mattsson (1988) 
the focus moves from market dynamics to the relationships a company develops inside its network. 
The starting point of this theory is the recognition of the fact that a company does not perform its 
activities as a separate entity but through a series of relationships with different partners, with whom 
it interacts. Therefore the internationalisation strategy of the company is the result of the influences 
of the strategies of all the companies that are present in the network, from suppliers to customers 
and so forth.
Based on these interactions, the company configures itself as one of the four prototypes shown in 
figure 2.3.
Figure 2.3 Network model of internationalisation
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The early starter is a company that has relationships with companies that are not internationalised 
and that is not expanded abroad itself. As a consequence of the little knowledge of foreign market 
in the network, the company cannot make use of relationships abroad. Therefore entrance in new 
markets needs to be done through FDI or greenfield investments. In case the company has limited 
resources, it will most probably opt for entrance through agents.
The lonely international is a company that has expanded its activities abroad but has established 
relationships only with companies that have not internationalized. Therefore it is the promoter of 
internationalisation inside its network.
The late starter is the only local player in a network of internationalised actors. Most of the times it is a 
very specialised company that can use the relationships with its internationalised partners as driving 
forces to enter international markets.
The international among others is a company that is internationalised as its network partners. It is 
already present in foreign markets and can further increase its geographical spread through small 
incremental steps consistent with its strategy and the resources available at a certain point in time.
Similar to the previous model, also the network model was criticised for a series of reasons, including 
the fact that it is not capable of explaining the internationalisation of companies that are not part of a 
network, the fact that it does not explain the change of position of firms inside the matrix and the fact 
that it does not consider the possibility to create joint ventures and other hybrid structures.
The third behavioural model of internationalisation is the international new ventures theory. Developed 
firstly in 1994 by Oviatt and Mac Dougall, it aims at explaining accelerated internationalisation. In 
fact both the previous theories could not explain why some companies immediately internationalise 
despite their small size and resource base. According to this framework there are four distinctive 
elements that identify these companies. First of all they internalise a minimal part of their activities, 
given the little resources available. Second, they opt for alternative governance structures, which 
are less costly. Third, given once again the reduced assets, they try to gain from foreign location 
advantages, relocating movable resources across national borders. A fourth peculiarity lies in the 
capability of these companies to create differentiation or cost advantage through a pool of unique 
resources.
These four elements are necessary for making the international new venture sustainable. Given these 
essential characteristics, companies that are born international can be classified in four categories, 
based on the very different types of competitive advantage they pursue.
Figure 2.4 illustrates them.
Figure 2.4 Types of International New Ventures
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The first and second types of companies – export/import start-ups and multinational traders – are 
also called international market makers; this is because they use disparities across borders to create 
new markets. They have internalised the logistics activities and focus either on a reduced number of 
countries – export/import start-ups – or on a large number of nations – multinational trader.
Geographically focused start-ups serve a particular specialised demand in a reduced number of 
countries through the use of foreign resources. They do not coordinate only logistics, but a larger 
number of activities. Their competitive advantage rests in the impossibility to imitate the tacit 
knowledge that governs the relationships among the activities that they coordinate.
The most radical new international firms are the global start-ups. They coordinate a large number of 
activities across a very large number of countries. They possess the most sustainable competitive 
advantage of all due to a socially complex inimitable knowledge bounded in several network alliances 
in multiple countries.
All the models presented above have been able to explain different factors and cases of international 
expansion. However, no single theory has sufficient explanatory power of its own (Coviello and 
McAuley, 1999). The models do not sufficiently consider the internal factors which constitute the 
FSAs of the company, like firm’s resources, decision-makers characteristics and management 
competencies, as well as external factors such as domestic and international market conditions, 
industry and sector trends and globalisation trends.
Moreover, these models are just stereotypes: each firm has a different story and will therefore follow a 
different internationalisation path, coherent with its internal and external influences (Bell et al., 2003). 
Nonetheless, if considered together they can help explaining the different paths followed by different 
companies.
For this reason, recently the so called “contingency approaches” have been developed (Kumar and 
Subramanian, 1997). According to these theories internationalisation depends on the internal and 
external factors that act on the company in a certain moment. Therefore a holistic approach has 
to be taken when looking at companies internationalise, taking into consideration all the factors 
that might play a role in a given moment. Bell et al. (2004) also state that “the nature and pace of 
internationalisation is conditioned by product; industry and other external environment variables, 
as well as by firm specific factors”. In their view, therefore, internationalisation is not a continuous 
process characterized by well-defined phases: companies can experience what they call “epochs” or 
“episodes” of internationalisation and also epochs of de-internationalisation, triggered by both internal 
and external contingencies. Moreover, the international expansion of the firm is path dependent: 
each step taken will be influenced by the previous decisions taken.
Bell (2004) categorises companies in three main groups: “traditional”, “born global” and “born-
again global”. Traditional firms do not choose internationalisation as a part of their growth strategy, 
but do so either to increase their sales volume in order to survive, or to respond to unsolicited 
enquiries and tend to have a management that is reluctant to internationalise. These companies are 
already well established in the home country and are more likely to follow the incremental path of 
internationalisation, through gradual steps and targeting one market at the time. Born-global firms are 
companies that configure themselves from the beginning as international players. Internationalisation 
is strongly linked with their competitive strategy and they proactively seek penetration into new 
markets. Their management is very committed to pursue growth by targeting numerous different 
markets at once, and seeking first-mover advantages. They do not start expansion after having 
strengthened their position in their home country, but in some cases exports even precede domestic 
market activity. Networks are of vital importance for these companies, as they tend to integrate into 
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clients’ existing channels. International expansion is also happening through client “followership”. 
Born-again global firms are a mixture of the previous two types. They did configure themselves 
as more traditional players, often in traditional industries, but subsequently to a “critical” incident 
(a takeover, an acquisition, a new technological development, the introduction of a new process 
technology, or the development of a new product) change their approach to internationalisation and 
become proactive in exploiting the new networks and resources gained from the critical incident. After 
a period of expansion inside their domestic market these companies embrace internationalisation 
in a rapid and dedicated way. In these cases clients’ networks also appear to play an important 
role in supporting a company’s expansion into foreign markets, and many markets are targeted 
simultaneously.
2.3 Implications for expansion paths
Each firm is different and therefore its strategic approach to internationalisation will be different. 
The internationalisation strategy is part of the overall competitive strategy of a company, and the 
decisions taken in that respect will be based on both internal and external factors which directly 
and indirectly have an impact on the scope, timing and mode of internationalizing activities. These 
forces will influence the choices of a firm on which internationalisation strategy to opt for, whether 
to take incremental steps or internationalise widely from the very beginning. The differences among 
countries and the perceived distance among them, also influenced by a company’s partners, 
resources constraints, the quality of the human capital and the risk behaviour of the management are 
all important factors that have an impact on the choice of the optimal scope of operations of a firm. 
Moreover, the networks to which the company belongs will also shape the company’s expansion 
path, fostering or hindering its internationalisation behaviour. 
Following this framework the next section will answer some questions related to the expansion paths 
of a number of Flemish and Brussels based multinational enterprises. 
To take into consideration all the models mentioned above and to synthesize the literature, we have 
developed a comprehensive scheme, outlined in figure 2.5. This meaningful scheme of analysis 
incorporates the research questions outlined above and will be used to analyse the cases.
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Figure 2.5 Research questions’ overview
First of all, we shall study which activities are performed by the subsidiaries abroad. Do companies 
expand internationalising their core activities or their peripheral business? Our hypothesis is that 
companies are successful in internationalising when they expand their core business, and use the 
firm-specific assets to enter the market in a different country. In many cases firms will reduce the 
diversification of their activities at home and abroad and focus on the most profitable lines of business 
in order to be able to free resources to invest in strengthening the company’s position in the chosen 
market segment.
The last reasoning is based on evidence from previous studies analysing the expansion path of 
European, uS and Japanese leading firms. These studies show that when expanding internationally 
a firm with a higher level of diversification will face higher constraints, both from a resource point 
of view and from a managerial point of view. Therefore, to overcome these constraints and be 
successful at international level, the firm will decide to focus only on those lines of business which 
are more profitable and in which it has developed its core competencies as this will increase the odds 
of establishing a strong market position in the target country, thus offsetting the losses in market 
share in the home country. Such restructurings have taken place in many companies at European 
level: corporations have divested non-core and peripheral activities and have returned to focus on 
their core business. At the same time they have internationalised these activities, expanding the 
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scope of their operations. Doing this they have been able to maintain their leading position in the 
core market. 
Successful companies have been influenced, in their expansion, by networks. We shall see 
how important it is for a company deciding to internationalise to have network relationships with 
international(ised) companies.
In what follows we shall show that Flemish MNEs have followed the same trend, divesting from 
peripheral activities to concentrate on their core business, while at the same time internationalising 
their activities. 
Then we shall look at how companies go abroad, therefore looking at the type of expansion path 
firms follow. Once they have chosen the product segment on which they want to focus, do they 
pursue an expansion strategy based on sequential entry, or do they follow the network model? 
We will see how different companies configure their international expansion coherently with their 
competitive strategy.
Third, we shall look at where companies go. We shall show that companies have increased the pace 
of internationalisation during the last 15 years, but could still use a stronger support especially to 
grab the opportunities coming from fast developing countries – such as BRIC countries – which are 
still not sufficiently exploited.
According to the findings of these three questions we shall then draw some conclusions and highlight 
some implications for public policy and investment supporting agencies. 
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In this study we want to look at the expansion paths of publicly listed, multi-national Flemish and 
Brussels companies. To do so, we built a longitudinal database that contains information about the 
selected companies and all their affiliates around the world.
The starting point for the construction of the database was the companies’ selection. We wanted to 
include in our study only companies that strategically invested abroad to expand their activities. 
To choose the companies, we started from “Euronext Brussels’ BEL 20” index. This index is a 
weighted index based on minimum 10 and maximum 20 share prices of companies deemed 
representative of the Belgian equity market (NYSE Euronext, 2008). Annex 1 provides an overview 
of all the companies that were present in the index at least one point in time from 1991 – the date of 
its composition – to 2009. 
During the above-mentioned period 48 companies appeared in the index, but not all of them can 
be used for our study. In fact, as mentioned above, we decided to focus on expansion paths over a 
reasonable time period. Obviously, all those companies that appeared in the index only for one day 
were removed. Three companies had then to be excluded, as shown in Table 3.1: 
Table 3.1 Companies that appeared only one day in the BEL 20
Company Number Name Period included 
in the index
Category
4 BarcoNet 13/11/2000 One day
42 Cumerio 29/04/2005 One day
44 SuEZ Environment 21/07/2009 One day
The reason why these companies appear only for one day is that they are a spin-off of the parent 
company; therefore after having separated from it they were listed for one day before disappearing 
from the BEL 20.
This left us with 45 companies. From these companies we had to remove 14 financial companies 
and 2 real estate companies. We excluded financial and real estate companies because for these 
industries it is more difficult to distinguish strategic investments from portfolio investments, and the 
goal of the study is to assess the internationalisation strategies of companies.
3  METHODOLOGY
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Table 3.2 Real estate and financial companies
Company Number Name Period included 
in the index
Category
2 Almanij
26/06/1998-
03/03/2005
Financial company
5 BBL
04/01/1993-
22/12/1997
Financial company
10 Cobepa
18/01/1999-
14/09/2000
Financial company
12 Cofinimmo 04/03/2003- Real estate
15 Dexia
22/12/1997-
02/03/2007
Financial company
19 Fortis 18/03/1991- Financial company
20 GBL 18/03/1991- Financial company
21 Generale Bank
18/03/1991-
02/07/1998
Financial company
23 GIB
18/03/1991-
11/11/2002
Financial company
26 KBC 04/01/1993- Financial company
28 Nationale Portefeuille 02/03/2006- Financial company
33 Royale Belge
18/03/1991-
26/06/1998
Financial company
34 Soc. Générale Belg.
18/03/1991-
02/07/1998
Financial company
35 Sofina
18/03/1991-
04/01/1993
Financial company
43
Ackermans & 
Van Haaren
02/03/2007- Financial company
48 Befimmo-Sicafi 02/03/2009- Real estate
This leaves us with 29 companies.
Subsequently, we removed three other companies, one because it changed enterprise number after 
a split-off (Gevaert was sold by Bayer on the first of July 1999 and changed into AGFA-Gevaert) 
and the other two because they were established in France (the former Suez CR and the new GDF 
Suez).
This brings us to a list of 26 companies that represent our first selection. Annex 2 provides an 
overview of the companies that are included in this first list, with their company code as assigned by 
Belfirst, important information on restructurings (including the date in which these took place), and 
the companies’ ultimate owners. This information allows us to assess whether a company is Belgian 
or foreign and to proceed to our next selection step, which involves removing all the companies 
that are controlled by of foreign companies. Table 3.3 gives an overview of the number of foreign 
companies according to different definitions.
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Table 3.3 Foreign companies in 2009
Selected BEL20 companies (in 2009) 26
Not more than 10% controlled by one foreign company 13
10-50% Foreign 6 
> 50% Foreign 7
If we use a broad definition, 13 companies of our list can be called foreign. This definition implies that 
at least 10% of equity is held by of a foreign company. Of these enterprises only 7 are foreign under 
a stricter definition with a 50% threshold. 
In the period under consideration four companies were taken over for more than 50% by a foreign 
company, which again implied that they had to be excluded from our analysis, according to both 
definitions. These are, as shown in Annex 2, CBR, PetroFina, Electrabel and Tractebel. This leaves 
us with 22 companies, 13 of which can be included according to both definitions. 
Table 3.4 List of Bel20 companies
 Code
BEL-20 
companies
Important 
information
Date ultimate owner
Country 
(region) 
of origin
1 437531762 Bekaert
Split-off 
Bekaert 
fencing
jan/05 BE (VLG)
2 202239951 Belgacom
Takeover 
Telindus (BE)
1/01/2006 Belgian state BE (VLG)
3 404535431 CMB
De-merger: 
CMB: Bocimar 
and Euronav + 
Exmar
2003 Marc Saverys BE (VLG)
De-merger: 
CMB + Euronav
4 400378485 Colruyt
Split-off Dolmen 
computers 
26/10/1999 Colruyt family BE (VLG)
5 403448140 D’Ieteren D’Ieteren family BE (BRu)
6 428750985 IBA Belgian Anchorage BE (WAL)
7 417497106 AB INBEV
Merger with  
Ambev (BR)
2004
Belgian and 
Brazilian families 
through Dutch fund
BE (BRu)Merger with 
Anheuser-Bush 
(uS)
18/11/2008
8 431676229
Omega 
Pharma
IPO 1998 Marc Coucke BE (VLG)
9 405666668 Recticel 
Compagnie du bois 
sauvage
BE (BRu)
10 403091220 Solvay Differo BE (BRu)
11 422674035
Telindus 
Group
Taken over 
Belgacom (BE)
Belgian state BE (BRu)
12 403053608 uCB Financière de tubize BE(BRu)
13 401574852 umicore Split-off Cumerio 2/05/2005 BE (BRu)
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Of the 13 ‘Belgian’ companies, 5 are located in the Flemish region, 7 in the Brussels Region and 1 in 
the Walloon Region. Of the 7 Brussels companies three have their principal Belgian activities outside 
Flanders, Solvay, uCB and umicore. This leaves 9 companies, as shown in Table 3.5. 
Table 3.5 Final subset of companies
 Code
BEL-20 
companies
Important information Date
ultimate 
owner
Country 
(region) of 
origin
1 437531762 Bekaert
Split-off Bekaert 
fencing
1/01/2005 BE (VLG)
2 202239951 Belgacom Takeover Telindus (BE) 1/01/2006 Belgian state BE (VLG)
3 404535431 CMB
De-merger: CMB: 
Bocimar and Euronav 
+ Exmar
2003 Marc Saverys BE (VLG)
De-merger: CMB + 
Euronav
4 400378485 Colruyt
Split-off Dolmen 
computers 
26/10/1999 Colruyt family BE (VLG)
5 403448140 D’Ieteren
D’Ieteren 
family
BE (BRu)
6 417497106 AB INBEV
Merger with Ambev 
(BR)
2004
Belgian and 
Brazilian 
families 
through 
Dutch fund
BE (BRu
Merger with 
Anheuser-Bush (uS)
18/11/2008
7 431676229
Omega 
Pharma
IPO 1998 Marc Coucke BE (VLG)
8 405666668 Recticel 
Compagnie 
du bois 
sauvage
BE (BRu)
9 422674035
Telindus 
Group
Taken over Belgacom 
(BE)
Belgian state BE (BRu)
Of this subset, three companies were chosen, based on the possibility to retrieve comprehensive 
information and three case studies were developed. These companies are Bekaert, Belgacom and 
AB Inbev.
For each year, from 1995 up to 2007, we collected information on each subsidiary of each company. 
Our main source of information to identify subsidiaries belonging to each of our companies was 
Belfirst, while to have more information on the European subsidiaries, we collected all the information 
from Amadeus and the Federal Planning Bureau.
First, a table was created for each year, including all those affiliates that were present in the company’s 
accounts in that year. In order to avoid mistakes and duplications, each subsidiary was given a 
shortname, which was unique per each subsidiary in each country. 
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The second step involved linking the different years with each other. This step was conducted to 
create one final complete dataset for the analysis, which contains all the information on the different 
subsidiaries in the different years. The system through which the affiliates were linked was a selection 
query in the access database, linking the shortname and the country, to see if the computer found 
two matches on both the two criteria.
Once the linkage process was finished, the table that originated contained a total of 368 affiliates1, 
belonging to the 3 different companies, as shown in the “Final Found Back” table of the database. 
This table is the main source of information for all the analysis that was conducted to assess the 
expansion path of the selected companies.
Box 1: Note on methodological issues
The main sources of information on the number and the location of the subsidiaries of the 3 com-
panies for compiling the database were Belfirst, Amadeus, and – for selected years – the Federal 
Planning Bureau. The main data sources for these databases are the companies’ accounts. For 
this reason, although a consistent methodology was followed for all the years, some companies 
showed inconsistent numbers of affiliates in some years, which at the beginning seemed to be in-
explicable. After careful analysis, though, the explanation for these extreme values could be traced 
back to inconsistencies in the accounts of the companies. 
Let’s take AB Inbev as an example. In 2003 the company has 51 affiliates, while in 2004 it has 
328 and in 2005 it has 327. In 2006 then it goes back to 52 affiliates, same value that it has for 
2007. Analysing more carefully the accounts we see that in 2004 and 2005 Amadeus lists also the 
subsidiaries of subsidiaries, while it does not do so in the other years. 
The most reasonable solution to deal with these extreme values was therefore to delete them. This 
did not imply any loss of information: in fact the amounts of – for example – both employees and 
turnover of these “excluded” companies were already included as aggregate values in the figures 
of the first-layer subsidiaries that own them.
Although this has no implication on the soundness of our report, it is an important point to note: 
companies do not follow a consistent methodology in recording data on their subsidiaries in their 
accounts. For this reason it is not easy to collect information about their activities in the different 
countries. It would be useful to find a way of forcing companies to use a more reliable way of 
registering their subsidiaries, introducing – for example – a unique coding system valid for all the 
companies, replicated throughout the years.
Another effect of these inconsistencies was the presence of “gaps”. During the linkage process 
some subsidiaries that – for example – were present in 1995 and in 1997 were not recorded as 
active in 1996. This result was not possible. Therefore a more detailed analysis of the companies’ 
accounts was performed. In most cases the solution was to add the affiliate to the “missing” year 
or to rename it: this because in most cases the problem was linked to an incorrect name-coding 
of the company.
1 The first list of affiliates included 1372 results. However, some of these needed to be deleted for 
the reasons explained in “Box 1: Methodological Issues” 
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This section starts with an analysis of the selected companies and then proceeds to analyse their 
foreign subsidiaries (=affiliated companies abroad), looking at the countries in which they are present 
and the sectors in which they are active. This will then allow us to draw some conclusions about the 
expansion path of the selected companies.
4.1 The selected companies: summary figures and brief history
Table 4.1 Key data on selected companies
Company
Year of 
Foundation
Date of 
incorporation
Sector
Company 
consolidated 
employees 
2007
Company consol-
idated revenues 
(last year available 
- million €)
Bekaert 1880 22/05/1989
Advanced ma-
terials, coatings, 
engineered wire 
products
23.000 4.000,00
Belgacom 1930 19/07/1930
Telecommunica-
tions
17.833 6.100,00
AB Inbev 1366 2/08/1977 Beverages 120.000 15.110,00
Bekaert and AB Inbev are manufacturing companies. Founded in 1880 and incorporated in 1989, 
Bekaert is a global manufacturer of steel fibres, and of a series of products based on this technology, 
like drawn steel wire. AB Inbev is a manufacturer, but in a much lower technology-intensive sector: 
it is the leading global brewer, and one of the top 5 consumers’ products companies in the world. 
Although by far the oldest company by foundation date, it was incorporated only in 1977.
Belgacom is, on the other hand, a services company. It is a major fixed and wireless telecom provider. 
Since 2006 it owns also Telindus, which offers ICT services and solutions to the corporate and public 
sectors, internationally. 
Companies can also be classified according to their international scope as outlined in their mission. 
Belgacom sees itself as an Eu centred company: most of its turnover is generated in the Eu although it 
is trying to expand in many other countries. On the other hand Bekaert and AB Inbev see themselves 
as more international companies, with their activities spread more evenly worldwide. 
Table 4.2 summarizes the most important restructurings and changes in the history of each 
company.
4  ANALYSIS OF THE CASES AND DISCuSSION
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Table 4.2 Most important restructurings 
Year Restructuring Involved companies Result
AB Inbev
1987 Merger Artois (BE), Piedboeuf (BE) Interbrew
2004 Merger Interbrew (BE); Ambev (BR) Inbev
2008 Merger Inbev (BE); Anheuser-Busch (uS) AB Inbev
Bekaert
2005 De-merger
Bekaert(BE), Bekaert-Fencing to 
Gilde (NL)
Bekaert (BE); Betafence 
(NL)
Belgacom
1996 Sale stocks
Belgian Government, ADSB 
Telecommunications consortium, 
Sofina, Dexia, KBC
Partly privatised: 50% 
minus one stocks sold
2005 Joint venture 
Swisscom Fixnet (CH) 
participates for 28% in 
Belgacom’s BICS (BE)
Strengthened position 
international carrier 
market
2006 Acquisition Belgacom,Telindus Strengthened position IT
2006 Acquisition Belgacom, Proximus
Strengthened position in 
mobile communication
2008 Acquisition Scarlet Sa (NL)
Stengthened position in 
private ADSL business
Sources: Belfirst, Belmofi (Federal Planning Bureau), Company websites
AB Inbev is a company that was born as a result of a series of mergers and acquisitions dating 
back to 1987. In fact, in that year after decades of strong competition Artois and Piedboeuf merged 
and created Interbrew, which then merged in 2004 with Ambev to create Inbev and in 2008 with 
Anheuser-Busch to create AB Inbev. Throughout all the years the company has been always active 
in the same market, beer, expanding all over the world in recent decades. 
Bekaert is – in a way – a more stable company. Since the date of its establishments, its history has 
been one of growth, with no major changes in name or ownership. From 1880 the company has 
focused on expanding worldwide, and was slowed down only by the crisis at the beginning of the 
80s that imposed some restructurings, although of minor impact. In fact the main consequence of 
the turmoil was a temporary refocusing of the activities on the more “traditional” lines of business. 
Then in the 90s the international expansion started again, mostly towards Asia and more specifically 
China, where the first production plant was opened in 1993. Since then the main strategy has been 
of locating production activities outside Europe while retaining R&D activities in the home region.
Belgacom started as a state-owned company, before the telecommunication sector was privatized. 
In 1996 it was partly privatised through the sale by the Belgian government, of 50%-minus-one 
shares to a telecommunication consortium that also included institutions from the banking sector. 
Since the privatisation the company has expanded in different segments, and in the framework of 
this strategy the most important acquisitions have been the one of Proximus and of Telindus, both 
finalised in 2006 and of Scarlet in 2008. The first two acquisitions strengthened the company’s 
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position in the mobile and IT segments, while the last one strengthened its position in the “private” 
high-speed internet market. 
4.2 Descriptive analysis of the affiliates
The “International Expansion Path Database” is made up of 368 affiliates belonging to 3 different 
companies in the time period that runs from 1995 to 2007. 
Table 4.3 summarizes the total number of affiliates found in the different countries per each 
company.
It presents a consolidated overview of all the subsidiaries that appeared in the index at least one time 
from 1995 to 2007. 
It is interesting to note that the total number of affiliates varies consistently from one company to 
another. Belgacom has a quite small number of affiliates if compared to Bekaert.
Another interesting observation is that in the timeframe considered some companies have extended 
their influence across many countries, while others have tended to remain more concentrated in their 
home region.
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Table 4.3 Consolidated overview of the affiliates per company and country subdivisions 2
BEKAERT BELGACOM AB INBEV
AE 1 AT 2 AR 1
AN 1 CH 3 AT 1
AR 1 CN 1 BA 1
AT 1 DE 3 BG 4
Au 5 ES 1 BO 1
BR 6 FR 9 BR 1
CA 6 GB 2 CA 1
CH 1 HK 1 CI 1
CL 11 IT 1 CL 1
CN 20 JP 2 CN 16
CO 1 LI 1 CS 1
CZ 5 Lu 3 CY 2
DE 11 NL 8 CZ 2
DK 3 PT 2 DE 10
EC 2 Ru 3 DO 1
ES 9 SE 2 EC 1
FI 1 SG 1 ES 1
FR 13 uS 3 FR 4
GB 19 TOTAL 48 GB 8
ID 3 GT 1
IE 3 HR 1
IN 4 Hu 1
IT 7 IT 3
JP 7 KR 1
KR 1 Lu 6
MX 4 ME 1
NL 12 MX 1
NO 1 NL 5
PA 2 PE 1
PE 2 PY 1
PL 4 RO 7
PT 1 RS 1
Ru 1 Ru 5
SE 3 SG 4
SG 4 SI 1
SK 2 SK 1
TR 2 SN 1
TW 2 uA 5
uS 20 uS 5
VE 2 uY 1
ZA 2 VE 1
TOTAL 206 Yu 1
ZR 1
TOTAL 114
2  An explanation of the abbreviations can be found in Annex 3.
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Table 4.4 Regional distribution of subsidiaries (1995-2007)
BEKAERT BELGACOM AB INBEV
%Eu 45,63% %Eu 68,75% %Eu 49,12%
ROE 1,94% ROE 8,33% ROE 9,65%
NA 12,62% NA 6,25% NA 5,26%
SA 15,53% SA 0,00% SA 10,53%
AP 23,30% AP 16,67% AP 22,81%
ROW 0,97% ROW ROW 2,63%
100% 100% 100%
BRIC 15,05% BRIC 2,08% BRIC 19,30%
Eu= Eu27 countries3; ROE= Rest of Europe; NA= North America; AP= Asia Pacific; ROW= Rest of 
the World; BRIC= Brazil, Russia, India, China.
All the companies have the Eu as their home region and therefore most of their subsidiaries are 
based there, although with significant differences.
As stated in its strategy, “Belgacom – together with Telindus –wants to be the leading network-centric 
ICT service provider in Belgium - and a reference for Europe”. Given this focus on the European 
market it is no surprise that Belgacom carries out almost 69% of its activities in its home region. It is 
also worth noting that the Telecom Services is a heavy regulated sector, and for this reason it is more 
difficult to enter foreign markets.
Differently from Belgacom, which has based most of its subsidiaries in Europe, Bekaert and AB Inbev 
pursued a more global strategy.
These two companies are very widespread, not only across Eu countries but also across world 
regions. They have less than half of their subsidiaries in Europe and, although it remained the most 
important base for their activities, they both have a relevant presence in Asia and in South America.
Table 4.5 shows the consolidated number of subsidiaries owned by the companies in the different 
countries in the period under analysis. The total number of countries in which the selected companies 
established a subsidiary is 64. Twenty-one out of the twenty-seven EC countries are represented. 
They make up for more than 54% of the total number of subsidiaries. Moreover, if we look at the top 
5, as shown in Table 4.5, European countries are strongly represented. 
3  Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slo-
vakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, united Kingdom.
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Table 4.5 Top 5 countries by number of subsidiaries (1995-2007)
BEKAERT BELGACOM AB INBEV
Country N of subsidiaries Country N of subsidiaries Country N of subsidiaries
CN 20 FR 9 CN 16
uS 20 NL 8 DE 10
GB 19 CH 3 GB 8
FR 13 DE 3 RO 7
NL 12 Lu/Ru/uS 3 Lu 6
It is worth noting that China and Russia are significantly present in the list. Both Bekaert and AB 
Inbev have a strong presence in China, while Belgacom is present in Russia, with 3 fully-owned 
subsidiaries. 
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4.3 Case Studies: analysis of the international expansion paths of Bekaert, 
Belgacom and AB Inbev in the period 1995-2007
In this chapter we analyse the different expansion strategies of the three selected companies: Bekaert, 
Belgacom and AB Inbev. Each of these three companies constitutes a case study to answer the 
research questions outlined in section 2.3.
We first look at the drivers for their initial international expansion. Then, after an overview of their 
expansion strategies until 1995, we analyse in more detail the developments over the twelve 
years taken into consideration in the construction of the Expansion Path Database. We then draw 
some conclusions over the linkages between the competitive strategy of the companies and their 
internationalisation strategies.
Bekaert
The first company in our dataset is Bekaert. Since it was founded, Bekaert has always been a very 
innovative company that uses R&D extensively to expand the possible applications in its two core 
markets: advanced metal transformation and advanced materials and coatings. When in 1951 the 
management of Bekaert recognised the opportunity of the newly emerging design for automotive 
tires – the radial tire – it decided to enter this market by producing the steel cords that are used as 
inner cords of this new product.
In order to be successful in a globalised market as the car tires one, Bekaert decided from the very 
beginning to opt for a global strategy. In fact, Bekaert had already started exporting in 1928, and in 
1933 it had invested in the British “Tinsley Wire”. From the first steps of its internationalisation the 
company had clearly in mind the linkage between geographic expansion and its competitive strategy: 
if its vision was to become a key player in the steel cord business it had to compete in an industry 
that was quickly globalising. Therefore it started its expansion beyond the European borders.
Looking at the way in which the company expanded abroad, we can see that it proceeded by 
incremental steps. After 28 years of exports towards the uS it opened the first office there – its 
first sales subsidiary – in 1956 and the first plant in 1974. The same strategy was followed in Latin 
America: it started investing in local companies during the 50s, consolidated its investments in the 
60s and then, in 1974, it opened its first plant in Ecuador. Similarly, the expansion in Asia started with 
the opening of a representative office in Tokyo in 1957, followed by the recognition – in 1983 – of 
the market potential of China and the subsequent investment in steel cords plants in the country. In 
fact, as China was a very different market from those previously addressed, Bekaert first established 
a majority joint venture with the local “Fasten Group” in order to reduce the risk associated with the 
lack of market knowledge and then acquired the control of 40% of the Chinese steel cord making 
company.
 
By 1995, the company was present with its own subsidiaries in 28 countries all over the world. To 
analyse the expansion path of Bekaert in the period 1995-2007, we can apply the scheme outlined 
in section 2.3 
In the 90s the strategy of Bekaert has been focused on two main aspects: dropping several 
business lines to focus only on the products with the highest value-added potential and continue 
the international expansion. Therefore it pursued a strategy of resources refocusing and international 
expansion. How were these two strategic decisions implemented?
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Let’s first look at what types of activities were performed by the subsidiaries of Bekaert outside 
Belgium. From the NACE codes of the subsidiaries contained in the Expansion Path Database we 
can derive that 76% of the activities that Bekaert has performed abroad in the period 1995-2007 
belonged to two of its core businesses, production of wires and wires coating. The remaining 24% 
can be subdivided in three groups: production of abrasive products, manufacture of tanks, reservoirs 
and containers of metal and manufacture of machinery. From this description it is already evident that 
these activities do not represent extra lines of business, but support activities that are connected to 
the core activities of the company.
The first result of our analysis is therefore that Bekaert has followed the path of other successful 
multinational companies: focusing on a reduced but strongly profitable set of business activities and 
invest in their internationalisation. 
Bekaert did this for a series of reasons. First of all divesting from less profitable activities enabled 
the company to free resources to be used for R&D in the two core segments and therefore develop 
expertise in new technologies in the framework of the two core lines. This is consistent with both 
of the company’s mission statements: becoming the world leader in the segments and obtaining 
sustainable profitable growth. As many other successful Eu companies Bekaert realised that to 
achieve sustainability it is necessary to perform less activities, focus and become leader in those 
activities. This has been a point of strength for Bekaert and has enabled it to grow into a real world 
leader. 
This first point – the decision of which activities to focus on and to expand abroad – is strongly linked 
to where to expand them. In fact theses decisions are based on the same drivers. 
Figure 4.1 shows the expansion path followed by Bekaert in the period 1995-2007.
Figure 4.1 Expansion Path of Bekaert 1995-2007
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under the statement “Global presence to support your business”, from 1995 to 2007 Bekaert has 
largely extended the geographical scope of its operations.
Although strongly internationalised in 1995, when it was already present in 28 countries, it still 
increased its presence in many fast growing regions, such as the Asia Pacific region. Although still 
strongly Europe-based, Bekaert has a foothold in all regions and is present in three of the four BRIC 
countries: it has built up joint ventures in Brazil and in India and has strongly developed in China.
The last country is a good example of how Bekaert expands its activities abroad. The company 
started supplying car manufacturers in the country. At this first stage, only trade relationships were 
developed, in line with the reduced knowledge of the country, the high risk connected with it and the 
uncertainty about its growth potential. Then, in the 90s, Bekaert started investing in China. If we look 
at the situation in the twelve years for which our database was constructed, we can see that in 1995 
Bekaert had only one subsidiary in China, which had been opened in 1993 as a joint venture with 
the local Fasten Group. Then, in 1996, the number of subsidiaries increased to 4, which became 7 
in 2000, 11 in 2003 and had reached a total of 14 in 2007. During a first phase, subsidiaries were 
established using joint ventures (as in 1993 with Fasten Group and in 1998 in Shenyang) which 
after a while became fully controlled by Bekaert. Only in a second phase, when the knowledge of 
the Chinese market had become stronger and the perceived risk reduced Bekaert started opening 
plants and subsidiaries that were under its full control from the very beginning. Together with the 
opening of two fully-owned production plants in China in 2006, Bekaert also established a R&D 
centre in the Jiangyin, which today employs 200 people. 
The path that was followed can therefore said to be incremental: the more there seemed to be 
opportunities the more Bekaert increased its commitment in the country. This increased the 
knowledge of the country, and therefore reduced the perceived risk making Bekaert more willing to 
create fully owned subsidiaries.
Looking at the drivers of Bekaert’s international expansion we see that there were multiple reasons 
behind the choice to strongly expand in China. First of all industry conditions played an important 
role: the globalisation of the car industry made it necessary for Bekaert to find ways of reducing factor 
costs and therefore the relocation of production to China was a way of achieving cost reduction 
strategies. However, a much more important driver was the network of Bekaert. As customers were 
more and more turning to China as preferred location for their activities, to ensure proximity to its 
customers Bekaert also invested in expanding in the country. The Chinese example shows that 
Bekaert’s geographical coverage changes in response to both customers’ demand and market 
trends. This is a very important point, as it shows the importance of the network of a company in 
deciding how to expand internationally. Going back to the network model developed in section 2.2, 
we can say that Bekaert acts as an “international among others”: it is part of an internationalised 
network of firms and seeks to expand even further together with its network partners.
Figure 4.2 summarizes the main findings related to Bekaert’s’ case, as analysed through the scheme 
proposed in section 2.3.
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Figure 4.2: Main findings on Bekaert
Belgacom
Belgacom is a company active in a totally different sector, broadly defined as telecom services. The 
history of Belgacom is completely different from the one of Bekaert. The company only started late 
internationalizing some of its activities. The reason for this, however, lies once again in the factors 
affecting the choice of the competitive strategy and in this case, more specifically, in the type of 
industry in which the company is active: telecommunications services. This industry has historically 
been strongly regulated, and for this reason until the liberalisation of the sector the company was 
public, enjoying a monopoly position in the country. under these conditions the company was not 
considering the possibility to go abroad, but it was focusing on the Belgian market giving priority 
to innovation: the main focus was on providing state-of-the-art communication infrastructure and 
services to Belgium and no action was taken to expand abroad. It is worth noting that the lack of 
international activities was also primarily due to the fact that there were strong barriers to entry in 
other European countries in the telecom sector. 
However, after 1987, when the European Commission’s initiative on telecommunication liberalisation 
was launched introducing a big change in the environment in which the company operated, 
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conditions changed. This first piece of legislation – incorporated in the Belgian law in 1991 – aimed 
at creating a new type of public sector company, with greater managerial autonomy. A second Eu 
initiative in 1994 went even further, pushing telephony and network operators to open up competition 
throughout Europe.
These two liberalisation waves had strong effects on Belgacom. On the one hand they imposed a 
change in the industry in which the company operated, as the law aimed at creating an environment 
favourable to the development of competition in the telecommunication services in Belgium. This 
introduced the potential threat of new entrants in the Belgian market, pushing the company to 
explore new potential markets to offset the risk of market share losses. On the other hand it made 
it possible for Belgacom to enter foreign markets, as liberalisation was to take place throughout 
Europe. 
The response to liberalisation was twofold, following two paths, one aimed at exploring external 
growth opportunities and the second one aimed at reinforcing Belgacom’s position inside Belgium. 
The first of these two strategies was the development outside Belgian borders. In 1991 the company 
started looking for market potential outside Belgium and it established links with other telecom 
providers in order to provide a one-stop shopping for customers that needed to use international 
networks. Moreover, in the same year it opened an agency in New York: this office operated in 
agreement with local providers to supply telecom services for Belgian companies in the uS. In 
the same year another agreement was signed with PTT in The Netherlands to cooperate more 
closely on infrastructure and services. In 1995 Belgacom started developing partnerships outside 
Belgium, with companies like Ameritech, Tele Denmark and Singapore Telecom. The main goal of 
all these partnerships was to develop an international network that offered voice and data capacity 
and connectivity services to telecom operators around the world. All these activities were grouped in 
1996 under the brand “Belgacom International Carrier Services (ICS)”, which is still active today and 
manages all the international network activities of Belgacom. In fact, if we look at the subsidiaries of 
Belgacom abroad, as listed in the Expansion Path Database, we can see that most of them belong 
to this business unit.
Regarding the second goal of the strategy, Belgacom put in place, in 2001, a restructuring plan (the 
so-called “BeST Plan”) which aimed at grouping activities in four business units and at disposing of 
certain non-profitable activities (like the security activities and the French activities of Infosources). 
Then in 2003 a new image was created for Belgacom, with a new logo and a new main goal: be 
more customers’ focused. Thanks to this change in image, Belgacom was able to launch an initial 
public offering in 2004, aimed at raising resources to finance its projects, which were mainly the 
development of the broadband and of digital TV.
Internationalisation is part of Belgacom’s strategy in two ways.
First of all, it is part of the development of its ICS business unit, as it enables it to find new partners 
to build a strong position in the network services. Second, it enables it to acquire knowledge about 
new market segments and strengthen technological position. An example of this was the acquisition 
of the Dutch company Scarlet in 2006. Belgacom did not acquire it to enter the Dutch market. It gave 
Belgacom access to a new market segment in Belgium. Moreover, the acquisition gave access to a 
new technology, which enables Belgacom to extend its multiplay offer in Belgium.
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Looking at the countries in which the company performs its activities, we can see from figure 4.3 that 
Belgacom’s base is definitely Europe. 
Figure 4.3 Expansion path of Belgacom in the period 1995-2007
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The reason behind this regional concentration can be found in the types of activities that are carried 
out abroad: as we have seen Belgacom is a provider of connectivity, voice and data capacity for 
telecom providers. This type of activity can be performed only in countries in which free entry is 
guaranteed by the liberalization of the sector. In those countries where there is one unique monopolist 
player who is the only telecom provider in the country and owns the infrastructures it is difficult if not 
impossible to enter the market.
Driven by the ongoing market liberalisation, the expansion path of Belgacom follows an incremental 
path. The company first established relationships with local partners and only in a second phase it 
acquired companies or set up its own subsidiaries. The knowledge of the market played therefore an 
important role in shaping the type of presence of Belgacom abroad. Moreover, an important role was 
played by regulation: the costs of overcoming country’s barriers were in some cases not offset by the 
possible gains coming from being present in that country. For this reason Belgacom’s approach to 
acquisitions in foreign countries has become – in Belgacom’s own words – “more disciplined”.
An overview of the main findings of the analysis of Belgacom can be found in figure 4.4.
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Figure 4.4 Main findings of the Belgacom case
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possible to further develop without a clear strategic plan.
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external factors affecting the company’s strategy was carried out.
The analysis indicated a saturated Belgian market, with low returns and little profit.
There were also internal problems that had to be faced: the integration among the two entities was 
difficult. The management of Artois, for example, had always strongly sustained personal initiative, 
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while inside Piedboeuf the conformity to the rules was more appreciated. Moreover, also regarding 
the future of the company the positions were opposite: Artois wanted to go global and pursuit 
international expansion, while Piedboeuf believed it was more reasonable to stay in Belgium and 
grow there.
Helped by the Boston Consultancy Group, a complete analysis of strength, weaknesses and 
competitors was carried out and a new plan was developed. This strategic plan was built on four 
pillars:
A focus on investments in emerging markets (like Hungary, Croatia, Bulgaria and Romania). This  
was very different from what previously suggested by McKinsey, and had the strong support of 
the management;
Investments in specialty beers, therefore moving from logic of volume to logic of profits. This was  
a big change inside the company, because it would have had a strong impact on the mentality of 
workers;
Investments in the water business. This proposal did not find full acceptance by the management  
as diversification was not very welcome;
Restructure the industrial environment through consolidation. 
Moreover, BCG strongly recommended the company stopped acting as two separate entities: the 
plan was unique and therefore they had to put themselves together and go for it together.
The plan was accepted by the management in summer 1989 and, although it was not easy to 
implement it due to strong resistance to change, its basic principles are still at the base of the 
company’s development. 
Internationalisation was therefore seen as a part of the overall competitive strategy: it was one of the 
main drivers of company’s success. First of all, there was a clear focus on the segment that had more 
potential for successful foreign expansion: beer. Although an investment was made at the beginning 
in the water business, it was soon abandoned, as being too far from the core competencies of the 
firm. The main reason for the divestment was that it was not possible to find the right skills and focus 
inside the company to manage such a different segment in the industry. 
If we look at the mix of activities carried out by the subsidiaries of AB Inbev outside Belgium in the 
period 1995-2007, we can see that they all refer to the beer business.
Once the choice of focusing only on beer was made, there was the issue on where to expand. 
As we have outlined above, AB Inbev decided after the merger to become a truly global company, 
starting the expansion from non-saturated markets, mostly newly developing countries in Central 
and Eastern Europe. The first deal signed was in Hungary, just before the iron curtain fell. It was 
a risky move to make, but the company took the decision based on sound market analysis and 
grounded in the competitive strategy it had developed. Later in the period 1995-2007 AB Inbev also 
expanded strongly in Asia and South America. 
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Figure 4.5 Distribution across regions of AB Inbev’s activities.
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In 1999, thanks to the merger with Ambev, the company started developing strongly in South 
America. All the subsequent acquisitions of AB Inbev were aimed at strengthening the international 
position in different countries and regions. The Latin America case is a good example of this. When 
Interbrew merged with Ambev in 1999 to create Inbev, the choice was to enter such an important and 
fast developing market. In fact, from that moment on the number of subsidiaries in South America 
increased, showing the increasing commitment of the company in the region. Another good example 
is China: in 2002, Interbrew strengthened its position in the country by acquiring stakes in the K.K. 
Brewery and the Zhujiang Brewery.
The way in which AB Inbev expands is through incremental steps. It first acquires partly or fully local 
companies and benefits from their local competitive position and knowledge of the targeted country. 
This goes together with a strengthening of the brands that belong to the acquired company and a 
growing commitment to that market. Only in a later stage the international brands get introduced and 
operations streamlined with the rest of the group.
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Figure 4.6 Main findings of the AB Inbev case
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5.1 Introduction
During the period going from 1995 to 2007 there has been an acceleration of internationalisation 
of European companies. This phenomenon also involved Belgian companies active in different 
industries.
From the analysis of the three selected multinationals we can draw some conclusions which can 
then be translated into success factors and can give general suggestions to company that want to 
start expanding internationally.
Table 5.1 Summary of the main findings of the Case Studies
Dimensions of 
analysis
Bekaert Belgacom AB Inbev
Industry
Technology intensive 
manufacturing firm 
in a very globalised 
industry
Services sector 
liberalised in 1987.
Traditional industry, 
highly consolidated 
industry.
Resources
First mover in a very 
highly profitable 
business
High innovative 
company (unlikely 
most of other Eu 
monopolists in the 
sector) with customer 
orientation
No competition on 
volumes but on 
profits. Many specialty 
beers, first mover in 
developing countries.
Capabilities
Focusing on fewer 
product lines but 
invest a lot in R&D 
in them to achieve 
sustainable growth
Integrated provider (in 
Belgium)
Investments on 
relationships (abroad)
Clear strategy that fits 
mission and vision
Clear role of 
internationalisation 
in the pursuit of the 
competitive strategy.
Link competitive 
strategy – 
internationalisation
Decision to 
internationalise linked 
to the competitive 
strategy pursued; 
linked to both internal 
and external factors 
(decision to enter a 
new segment, very 
globalised industry).
2 drivers for 
internationalisation: 
- Internal: give 
customers an 
internationally 
integrated service
- External: Market 
liberalisation (seen as 
both a threat and an 
opportunity)
Four pillars 
competitive 
strategy in which 
internationalisation is 
one of the drivers to 
success.
5 CONCLuSIONS AND SOME POLICY IMPLICATIONS
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Dimensions of 
analysis
Bekaert Belgacom AB Inbev
Type of 
Internationalisation 
strategy pursued 
(WHAT?, WHERE?, 
HOW?)
WHAT: Core activities 
→ 90s= focus on 
most profitable lines 
+ raise international 
profile of operations.
HOW: Incremental 
(sales subsidiaries 
first, then JV and 
in a third stage 
establishment of fully-
owned plants).
WHERE: Decision 
influenced by network 
partners + growth 
opportunities.
WHAT: Integrated 
network services 
for local telecom 
providers. 
HOW: Incremental 
→: agreements, JVs, 
establishment of 
owned subsidiaries.
First expansion 
into neighbour and 
liberalised countries.
WHERE: Liberalised 
telecom markets.
WHAT: Specialty 
beers.
HOW: Incremental → 
Acquisition of local 
partners to expand; 
first strengthen local 
brands to create 
commitment and 
then introduce own 
brands.
WHERE: Global
First of all the three companies had had a clear understanding of the industry in which they were 
competing and the internationalisation potential. All of them clearly considered the degree of 
competition and the specificities of the environment. Bekaert was active in a very globalised industry 
(being a supplier for car manufacturers) and therefore had an incentive to opt for a global strategy 
from the very beginning. In turn, Belgacom’s focus was not (and still is not) on internationalisation: 
to fulfil its strategic objectives it is not so relevant to pursuit a fully global strategy. Therefore it made 
a “functional” use of international expansion, using it to strengthen its market position in Belgium 
through the acquisition of new technologies and to strengthen its offers in terms of international 
network.
It is also worth noting that a point of strength for Bekaert was the fact that it was part of an international 
network: most of its customers were – and still are – international players, and this strongly pushed the 
company towards becoming a global player. We can therefore say that being part of an international 
network is very important for a company as this is a source of competitive advantage when deciding 
to internationalise. AB Inbev did not have such a network when it started expanding. This is one of 
the reasons why it globalised its activities through the acquisition of local companies: the knowledge 
of the local markets could not be acquired in a different manner.
In all the three cases the decision to internationalise was seen as a part of the overall competitive 
strategy. AB Inbev needed to expand the geographic scope of its operations because of a saturated 
home market, Bekaert needed to go global to become the preferred supplier of car making companies, 
which were very internationalised themselves, and Belgacom internationalised to acquire expertise 
and to strengthen its product portfolio and market position. 
An interesting trend in the years analysed is the fact that companies refocused their resources on 
core activities and extended their international scope. This type of restructuring has taken place in 
many companies and has also been for the case companies an important point of strength. In fact 
refocusing has made it possible for Bekaert and for Belgacom to invest more resources into R&D 
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and into customer care. For AB Inbev divesting from the water business meant avoiding a waste of 
resources: the development of the skills necessary to make that business profitable were going to be 
too costly and the business did not fit with the overall strategy of the company. 
5.2 Policy Implications
Following the development of the three cases we can draw some conclusions on the main 
international developments of the selected companies and relate them to changing needs for public 
policy instruments to support these developments. Obviously, those implications are rather general 
and relate only to the cases investigated in this study. 
As shown in Figure 5.1, we can identify three main areas of intervention: inside the firm, within the 
industry and in the broader context. 
These factors are not the only important ones, but the ones on which we would like to focus, since 
our analysis shows they can be further improved and strengthened.
We will analyse each of these three dimensions and look at which are the main actions that both public 
bodies and companies can take to more effectively structure the internationalisation process.
Figure 5.1 Main measures to support internationalisation
Sector specific expertise and learning
Companies from small open economies that focus on profitable niche markets in the domestic and 
the international market follow diverse international expansion paths and use a variety of expansion 
modes (export, joint venture, wholly owned subsidiary, licensing, international outsourcing,...) in 
implementing their strategy. For this reason it is necessary to develop a wide set of instruments that 
support companies in their expansion strategies, ranging from the provision of basic information about 
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foreign markets to the development and sharing of best practices in using the different expansion 
modes in the different potential host countries. For this reason companies need to be supported 
when deciding in which countries to expand: this can help companies understand which type of 
“expansion mix” (the how, where and what) to choose and how to effectively integrate international 
expansion into the overall company’s strategy. Most of the companies that start internationalising do 
not have enough resources (both from a financial and a skills perspective) to choose the right mix and 
the right partners or to understand foreign business practices, export procedures and regulations. 
The type of knowledge that agencies can offer needs to be specialised to meet the information 
needs of the firm and should be industry-specific. 
High quality and useful support can be given if there is a strong sectoral expertise present in the 
organisation or in the supporting network. 
Easy access to relevant information helps minimizing the risks and the costs linked to 
internationalisation. 
This strong knowledge base needs to be developed both in high tech and more traditional sectors. 
The learning process should be supported by specific sector organisations and organized through 
the construction of specialized fora in which companies can share ideas and best practices and 
learn from the experience of successful international players operating in different countries. 
Companies need to recognise the importance of good information. Internationalisation decisions 
have to be linking the company’s competitive strategy to the particular environment of the targeted 
country. 
Networking domestically and abroad 
Not only knowledge should be sector or cluster specific, but also focused networking activities 
should be organized around it. In fact establishing business relationships with business partners in 
a foreign country is even more costly than gathering information and sometimes it is not easy to find 
the right counterpart. 
As we have seen analysing the cases, it is very important for a company to be part of relevant 
business networks, stretching across borders but also inside the home country with experienced 
international actors.
Networks make it possible for companies to connect to international supply chains, share knowledge, 
knowhow and best practices. The synergies that develop inside networks can be very profitable for 
a company, as one of their key advantages is the fact that participating involves more advantages 
than costs. 
Agencies therefore need to assist globalising firms (especially fast internationalising ones) to develop 
their international network effectively and systematically. Moreover they must help firms capitalise on 
the opportunities to access networks and get in touch with reliable partners (thanks to interaction 
with internationalised actors). 
The forging of public-private partnership engaging supporting agencies with specialized international 
private network organisations helping firms to internationalize appears as a reasonable way to 
achieve this end. 
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Finally, in order to help companies establish business relationships with reliable local partners, 
agencies should invest in image building and reputation of the region or country they represent and 
in their role as broker in bringing companies together within partnership.
Once again it’s key that companies understand the importance of being part of these networks. They 
should look at them as part of their overall strategic resources and exploit them as much as possible 
to have a competitive advantage when entering a new market.
Reduce transaction costs: the importance of nonmarket strategy and economic 
diplomacy
In the internationalisation of their activities, companies have to face high transaction costs of doing 
business in countries characterized by different institutions and business practices. 
Doing business on a global scale in fact involves dealing with an increasing number of actors that are 
more and more interconnected and interdependent. The process of devolution of powers from the 
national governments to both regional/local authorities and supranational bodies and the increasing 
importance of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) creates a whole new set of relationships 
and makes it necessary for companies to intensify and diversify the efforts to influence domestic 
and international policies in line with the overall strategy of the company. On the other hand, home 
governments and development agencies need to promote their companies abroad and ensure a 
level playing field for them.
This new system of relationships among actors and cross influences is better known as postmodern 
economic diplomacy.
When doing business abroad companies need a high degree of country-specific knowledge and 
of business acumen which needs to be developed to avoid failures. The most interesting emerging 
markets differ so deeply from the “traditional” export markets of internationalised companies that it’s 
not possible to apply successful “traditional western” practices when expanding there. At the same 
time companies need to comply with international standards and respond to the social pressures of 
NGOs; failing to comply with the requirements of these different realities can as a result lead to a loss 
of competitive advantage and a missed business opportunity.
In order to deal with all these different instances, both governments and companies have started 
developing new diplomatic figures to promote their own interests and to influence the decision 
making process at the different levels.
Figure 5.2 gives an overview of the different types of diplomats and their relationships in postmodern 
economic diplomacy.
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Figure 5.2 Main actors of postmodern economic diplomacy
Governments need to develop two types of professional figures. Economic diplomats try and 
influence the policy making process at supranational level. They promote the country interests and 
policy agenda when confronted in international fora and give advice to their countries on how to 
influence the policy making processes of foreign countries. 
Commercial Diplomats aim at supporting the home country business promoting both inward and 
outward investments and trade. They advise international companies who want to invest in the home 
country and help national companies to internationalise exploiting market opportunities arising from 
opening of international markets. 
Both these actors should help to overcome the obstacles to internationalisation and create a level 
playing field.
 
This becomes clear if we look at the three case studies. The analysed companies are increasingly 
active in BRIC countries. However, there are still high barriers and hidden costs to do business in 
countries such as China or India. Sometimes they are subtle and difficult to tackle and overcome. 
This is why governments need to intervene through the action of economic diplomacy – to shape the 
policies that allow market opening – and commercial diplomacy – to directly support companies.
Support agencies mainly cover roles of commercial diplomacy: they should focus on helping 
companies to know local conditions and local institutions better and connect them to the right 
partners for organizing international transactions. This is even more true for companies that decide 
to expand into developing countries, where institutions are missing and the “liability of foreignness” 
is high for companies investing in those countries.
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Civil society actors play a role in bringing forward the social and environmental concerns. They try 
to influence both companies and the government in order to protect the instances of the civil society. 
They interact with the different actors and participate to the policy making process. 
Given this increasing interaction among the different actors, companies need to develop diplomat 
figures in order to set their priorities and support their interests at a global level. Business diplomats 
actively uphold the company’s interests towards third parties, both at a governmental level and 
at a social level. They identify new business opportunities in international markets and influence 
the government’s decision making process in order to ensure an alignment between corporate 
interests and national policy. As the interface between the company and the external world, business 
diplomats need to be a figure that is not – as often happens today – opportunistically hired when 
exploring new market opportunities. The business diplomat needs to have a deep understanding of 
the company’s competitive strategy and – consequently – of its internationalisation goals in order to 
ensure an effective agenda setting in front of external actors. All these actions are generally known 
as “nonmarket strategies”.
As Baron (2001) states, nonmarket strategies are “all the activities developed by firms to influence 
policy makers”. Baron’s study also proves that these types of strategies – such as informational 
lobbying, interest group formation, media campaigns, etc. – can be effectively integrated with market 
strategies in order to successfully achieve a company’s internationalisation goals. 
The Corporate Diplomat, on the other hand, is the actor whose mission is to ensure the internal 
consistency of the company strategy. He needs to understand the different cultural backgrounds and 
mindsets of the different subsidiaries and make sure these are consistent with the overall strategic 
goals of the company. He acts as a point of contact for the different realities and is in charge of 
guaranteeing effective information flows. 
It is worth noting that big global multinationals are more likely to develop these profiles because they 
have a larger resource base and superior lobbying skills. For this reason is very important – especially 
for SMEs – to have access and actively participate in networks, where they can work together and 
interact with large companies and learn from their experiences. 
5.3 Some good practices in internationalisation support policies
In the previous section we grouped the main measures to support internationalisation around 
three main themes. We will now briefly look at European examples of practical implementation of 
these measures. These best practices constitute examples of what public bodies can do to foster 
development in these three dimensions.
Sector specific expertise and learning
An important aspect of doing business abroad is finding the right partner. To do so, companies need 
to have access to high value information regarding business opportunities. CzechTrade, for example, 
has developed an extensive database of information of foreign companies that are willing to do 
business with Czech counterparts. All the information – collected mainly through the embassies – is 
available for consultation, translated in Czech and organised per sector. Moreover, local intelligence 
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helps companies in the process of matchmaking. Each year an average of 5.000 export opportunities, 
4.000 tenders and 700 offers get published, proving that the system works pretty well.
Another best practice in providing useful information is the experience of AHK, the German Chambers 
of Commerce Abroad. These go a bit further in supporting companies: they do not only offer relevant 
and sector specific information, but also firm-specific consultancy services that allow also SMEs to 
get experienced advice on their specific situation. They work both as support institutions for German 
companies that want to do business abroad and single point of contact for foreign companies that 
want to do business in Germany. The members are therefore both German and non German (local): 
this makes it possible to exchange knowledge on the different market and put in contact potential 
partners.
One last example in this category is the experience of b2fair. 
This is a supporting instrument for firms that want to cooperate and find business partners. It is a 
way of going beyond the traditional concept of “business fair” in order to make it more effective. The 
objective of the project is to guide companies from the fair-preparation phase – making a database of 
company profiles available for consultation –, through the fair – offering boots and interpreting services 
– and after the fair – through the follow-up of the contacts made. This doesn’t only enhances the 
effectiveness of the public relation moment of the fair but also allows the website to collect detailed 
information about many companies in different countries and therefore support the matchmaking 
process in all successive occasions.
Networking domestically and abroad 
The first interesting project for promoting networks is called FinPro and has been developed in Finland. 
This project aims at putting together a number of SMEs that have a common internationalisation goal. 
The group of companies develops a shared project for expanding in one of more foreign markets and 
then FinPro finds for them an external manager who will be in charge of this project. This person will 
act as a business diplomat, doing door opening, market studies and partner finding. The main goal 
is to help the consortium learn more about the foreign market(s) in which they want to expand and 
to teach them how to exploit the internal synergies.
Another interesting project, developed in Hungary, aims at creating entrepreneurial business networks 
with the aim of cooperating, sharing knowledge and developing an entrepreneurial culture towards 
international expansion. This should result in an increase in turnover and exports for the companies 
involved. The project as three phases:
1 – Selection of the SMEs in the region and first discussions about what they expect from the 
partnership. Selection of large companies that have a long and successful experience together 
with a strong internal intelligence on entering foreign markets; these large companies will work as 
“mentors” for the SMEs.
2 – Development of trainings, workshops and other activities aimed at exchanging experiences 
among the SMEs and with the large enterprises; this teambuilding phase lasts on average one 
month. 
3 – Organisation of monthly seminars on different topics in order to strengthen SMEs knowledge of 
different issues of internationalisation.
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The creation of these networks makes it possible for SMEs both to access to the knowledge base 
of large companies and to interact with each others to form alliances to give them the right scale to 
enter foreign markets. 
Reduce transaction costs: the importance of nonmarket strategy and economic diplomacy
When looking at economic diplomacy, a very interesting experience is the Dutch experience. The 
Dutch Minister for Foreign Trade, Frank Heemskerk in a recent speech clarified very well the basic 
principles that guide Dutch economic diplomacy efforts.
In the words of the Minister, “economic diplomacy means using political influence and contacts 
at both the bilateral and multilateral level to promote trade, facilitate foreign investments by Dutch 
companies, stimulate investments by foreign companies in the Netherlands and reduce the risks 
involved in cross-border transactions for Dutch companies”.
There are two main points which are central to the action of economic diplomacy: the increasing 
importance of Asian players and the impact that new comers from that area have on Dutch strategic 
sectors (such as water management, energy, port development and medical services).
As Asian countries increase their dominance in world economy, cultural and institutional differences 
matter more and more. For this reason governments need to invest in cultural and institutional 
understanding in order to be able to open markets and ensure their own companies level playing 
field.
This is not valid only for SMEs: also big companies increasingly depend on government support, 
especially because public authorities can:
Open business opportunities abroad, 
understand which sectors are gaining significance in emerging markets and ensure that home  
country’s companies retain their competitive advantage there.
There are interesting examples of effective Dutch economic diplomacy.
The first example we can make relates to the oil and gas fields in Russia’s Yamal Peninsula. Dutch 
companies showed a strong interest in having the opportunity to access these natural resources, 
therefore the government took action to help them gaining access. It acted in two steps. First of 
all it established a partnership between interested Dutch companies and research institutes. In this 
way they could enter negotiations with the Russian government showing a consortium with a solid 
background of expertise, which from previous experience proved to be rather important.
Once the case was strong enough it was brought to the Russians and Gazprom by representatives 
of the Dutch government.
As a result a partnership between Dutch and Russian companies was created, to explore the potential 
of the Region and remunerative contracts for Dutch dredging companies were signed. 
This shows economic diplomacy is a way of influencing governments through actions that are aimed 
at finding the correct way to show the counterpart the value of the partnership offered. It is about 
finding the right channels and the right motivations, based on strong experience, to use to gain 
access and to opportunities.
A second example involves a sector which is strategic for the Dutch economy: water management. 
After the hurricanes stroke in Louisiana, the Dutch government established a trade mission to that 
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area, and created public private partnerships (PPP) aimed at promoting the Dutch approach to water 
management. Both parties – the region and Dutch companies – benefited from this action, and 
now Dutch engineers and scientists are working on the areas of Mississippi, California and Florida 
using the most recent technologies to protect them from floods. This has a very positive impact 
on the area, as protection from floods is a critical issue. At the same time the Dutch government 
promoted a strategically relevant sector for the Dutch economy, getting remunerative contracts for 
Dutch companies. 
This matchmaking between the needs of the area and the companies was helped by the fact that 
the Dutch government knows very well the strengths of the Dutch economic sectors and knows 
exactly what can successfully be promoted abroad. This gives it the capability to explore the right 
opportunities and enter the right markets at the right moment.
The same happened for the promotion of Dutch know-how that made it possible to get a stake in 
the 5.5 billion dollar project to enlarge the Panama Canal. 
Once again a strong sectoral expertise combined with diplomatic sensibility and knowledge of the 
counterpart made it possible to open a whole new market: now Dutch consultancy groups are 
advising the government of Panama while many Dutch companies are given the opportunity to work 
on this project.
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Globalisation shapes the way of doing business, pushing more and more companies towards 
international expansion. Both big and small companies have to cope with increasing competition 
coming from abroad and – at the same time – look outside their home market to find business 
opportunities. 
In order to be successful, companies need to be well prepared before confronting themselves on an 
international scale, and to do so they need to have a well planned international expansion strategy. 
This defines the mode of entry into foreign markets and, more specifically, the “expansion mix” a 
company chooses: the “how”, the “where” and the “what”.
To avoid failure this mix needs to fit the competitive strategy of the company, because each firm is 
different and so will be its approach to internationalisation.
Another important difference among firms is represented by the path they follow to pursuit their 
international expansion. Many theories – often referred to as behavioural process theories – have 
been formulated in this respect. The analysis of the case studies in this paper, based on companies 
active in different sectors, tends to support the view that the most effective way of looking at this 
issue is using a “holistic” approach, therefore keeping into consideration all the factors that affect 
each company in a given moment.
The policy implications that derive from this analysis show that there are three main areas where 
action is needed to support internationalisation. This of course does not imply that the support 
actions of agencies and policy makers comes down to these three aspects, but that they seem to 
be the most relevant issues for companies today, where also they feel action should be taken. These 
three areas are:
The development of sector specific expertise and learning 
The development of an active supporting  network, domestically and abroad 
The reduction of transaction costs through nonmarket strategies and economic diplomacy. 
All three areas involve active interaction from both parties, government and companies. Government 
officials and agencies with a strong knowledge of the needs of the companies in their country 
and with solid sector knowledge will be more able to open up markets for companies and help to 
create cross-border networks. Empirical evidence shows that networks of companies have a higher 
negotiation power as they bring different expertise which makes them stronger in front of international 
governments and are more convincing in the package they have to offer to interested countries.
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Annex 1: Companies included in the BEL20 index from 18/03/1991 to 31/08/09
Company 
Number
Name Period included in the 
index
Category
1 Agfa-Gevaert 14/06/1999-02/03/2009 First selection
2 Almanij 26/06/1998-03/03/2005 Financial company
3 Barco 18/03/1991-04/01/1993 First selection
23/12/1996-02/03/2007
4 BarcoNet 13/11/2000 One day
5 BBL 04/01/1993-22/12/1997 Financial company
6 Bekaert 18/03/1991-14/06/1999 First selection
16/12/1999-
7 Belgacom 29/03/2004- First selection
8 CBR 18/03/1991-16/12/1999 First selection
9 CMB 04/01/1993-18/01/1999 First selection
10 Cobepa 18/01/1999-14/09/2000 Financial company
11 Cockerill 19/12/1994-23/12/1996 First selection
12 Cofinimmo 04/03/2003- Real estate
13 Colruyt 04/01/1993- First selection
14 Delhaize Group 18/03/1991- First selection
15 Dexia 22/12/1997-02/03/2007 Financial company
16 D’Ieteren 02/07/1998-02/03/2006 First selection
17 Electrabel 18/03/1991-15/11/2005 First selection
18 SuEZ CR 15/11/2005-21/07/2008 First selection
19 Fortis 18/03/1991- Financial company
20 GBL 18/03/1991- Financial company
21 Generale Bank 18/03/1991-02/07/1998 Financial company
22 Gevaert 18/03/1991-19/12/1994 First selection
23 GIB 18/03/1991-11/11/2002 Financial company
24 IBA 15/11/1999-04/03/2003 First selection
25
AB INBEV (ex:Interbrew/
Inbev)
01/02/2001- First selection
26 KBC 04/01/1993- Financial company
27 Mobistar 11/11/2002- First selection
28 Nationale Portefeuille 02/03/2006- Financial company
29 Omega Pharma 04/03/2002- First selection
30 PetroFina 18/03/1991-14/06/1999 First selection
31 Real Software 14/06/1999-01/02/2001 First selection
32 Recticel pref. 18/03/1991-04/01/1993 First selection
33 Royale Belge 18/03/1991-26/06/1998 Financial company
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Company 
Number
Name Period included in the 
index
Category
34 Soc. Générale Belg. 18/03/1991-02/07/1998 Financial company
35 Sofina 18/03/1991-04/01/1993 Financial company
36 Solvay 18/03/1991- First selection
37 Telindus Group 14/09/2000-04/03/2002 First selection
38 Tessenderlo 18/03/1991-04/01/1993 First selection
27/07/1998-29/03/2004
39 Tractebel 18/03/1991-15/11/1999 First selection
40 uCB 18/03/1991- First selection
41 umicore 18/03/1991- First selection
42 Cumerio 29/04/2005 One day
43 Ackermans & Van Haaren 02/03/2007- Financial company
44 SuEZ Environment 21/07/2009 One day
45 Nyrstar 03/03/2008-02/03/2009 First selection
46 GDF Suez 21/07/2008- First selection
47 Telenet Group 02/03/2009- First selection
48 Befimmo-Sicafi 02/03/2009- Real estate
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Annex 2: First selection
Code
BEL-20 
companies
Important 
information
Date
ultimate 
owner
Country 
(region) 
of origin
1 202239951 Belgacom
Takeover Telindus 
(BE)
1/01/2006 Belgian state
BE 
(VLG)
2 400378485 Colruyt
Split-off Dolmen 
computers 
26/10/1999
Colruyt 
family
BE 
(VLG)
3 400465290 CBR
Taken over 
Heidelberger Zement 
AG (DE)
16/12/1999
Heidelberger 
Zement AG
DE
4 401574852 umicore Split-off Cumerio 2/05/2005
BE 
(BRu)
5 402206045 Delhaize
Alliance 
capital
uS
6 403053608 uCB
Financière 
de tubize
BE(BRu)
7 403079441 PetroFina Taken over Total (FR) 14/06/1999 Total FR
8 403091220 Solvay Differo
BE 
(BRu)
9 403170701 Electrabel Taken over Suez (FR) 15/11/2005 GDF Suez FR
10 403203264 Tractebel
Taken over Suez-
Lyonnaises des Eaux 
(FR)
15/11/1999 GDF Suez FR
11 403448140 D’Ieteren
D’Ieteren 
family
BE 
(BRu)
12 403940662
Cockerill 
sambre
Merger usinor 
Group (FR)
1/06/1998 Arcelor Mittal Lu
13 404021727 Gevaert
Merger Agfa AG 
(DE), Gevaert Photo 
Producten N.V. (BE) 
and Bayer (DE)
1/06/1964 Bayer DE
14 404535431 CMB
De-merger: CMB: 
Bocimar and 
Euronav + Exmar
2003
Marc 
Saverys
BE 
(VLG)
De-merger: CMB + 
Euronav
15 405666668 Recticel 
Compagnie 
du bois 
sauvage
BE 
(BRu)
16 412101728
Tessenderlo 
Chemie
SNPE FR
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17 417497106 AB INBEV
Merger with Ambev 
(BR)
2004
Belgian and 
Brazilian 
families 
through 
Dutch fund
BE 
(BRu)Merger with 
Anheuser-Bush (uS)
18/11/2008
18 422674035
Telindus 
Group
Taken over 
Belgacom (BE)
Belgian state
BE 
(BRu)
19 428750985 IBA
Belgian 
Anchorage
BE 
(WAL)
20 429037235
Real 
Dolmen
Merger Real 
Software (uS) and 
Dolmen (BE) 
1/09/2008 Real holding uS
21 431676229
Omega 
Pharma
IPO 1998
Marc 
Coucke
BE 
(VLG)
22 437531762 Bekaert
Split-off Bekaert 
fencing
-0,000498753
BE 
(VLG)
23 456810810 Mobistar
France 
Telecom SA
FR
24 473191041 Barco Split-off Barconet 13/11/2000
Franklin 
Resources
uS
25 477702333
Telenet 
group
Liberty 
global
uS
26 888728945 Nyrstar FMR LLC uS
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Annex 3: List of relevant countries’ ISO codes
Country ISO Code
uNITED ARAB EMIRATES AE
NETHERLANDS ANTILLES AN
ARGENTINA AR
AuSTRIA AT
AuSTRALIA Au
BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA BA
BuLGARIA BG
BERMuDA BM
BOLIVIA BO
BRAZIL BR
BELARuS BY
CANADA CA
SWITZERLAND CH
CÔTE D’IVOIRE CI
CHILE CL
CHINA CN
COLOMBIA CO
CYPRuS CY
CZECH REPuBLIC CZ
GERMANY DE
DENMARK DK
DOMINICAN REPuBLIC DO
ECuADOR EC
ESTONIA EE
SPAIN ES
FINLAND FI
FRANCE FR
uNITED KINGDOM GB
GREECE GR
GuATEMALA GT
HONG KONG HK
CROATIA HR
HuNGARY Hu
INDONESIA ID
IRELAND IE
INDIA IN
ITALY IT
JAPAN JP
KOREA, REPuBLIC OF KR
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LIECHTENSTEIN LI
LITHuANIA LT
LuXEMBOuRG Lu
MOLDOVA, REPuBLIC OF MD
MONTENEGRO ME
MEXICO MX
NETHERLANDS NL
NORWAY NO
PANAMA PA
PERu PE
POLAND PL
PORTuGAL PT
PARAGuAY PY
ROMANIA RO
SERBIA RS
RuSSIAN FEDERATION Ru
SWEDEN SE
ZAIRE (CONGO, THE DEMOCRATIC 
REPuBLIC OF)
ZR
SINGAPORE SG
SLOVENIA SI
SLOVAKIA SK
SENEGAL SN
THAILAND TH
TuNISIA TN
TONGA TO
TuRKEY TR
TAIWAN, PROVINCE OF CHINA TW
uKRAINE uA
uNITED STATES uS
uRuGuAY uY
VENEZuELA VE
Former Yugoslavia Yu
SOuTH AFRICA ZA
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